Glean Enterprise RBAC

Overview

Glean's enterprise search aggregates content from dozens of connectors (Google Drive, Confluence, Slack, Salesforce). RBAC ensures users only see documents they are authorized to access. Permissions flow from source systems through connector-level ACLs into Glean's unified index. Misconfigured permissions mean search results leak sensitive data across teams. SOC 2 and GDPR compliance require document-level access control and full audit trails on who searched what.

Role Hierarchy

Role	Permissions	Scope
Super Admin	Create API tokens, manage all connectors, configure SSO	Organization-wide
Admin	Add/edit datasources, manage user groups, view analytics	Assigned datasources
Content Manager	Set document permissions, manage allowedGroups per datasource	Own datasources
User	Search and view permitted documents	Documents matching ACLs
Viewer	Search only, no document previews or snippets	Restricted document set

Permission Check

async function checkDocumentAccess(userId: string, documentId: string): Promise<boolean> {
  const response = await fetch(`${GLEAN_API}/permissions/check`, {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${GLEAN_API_TOKEN}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({ userId, documentId }),
  });
  const result = await response.json();
  return result.hasAccess ?? false;
}

Role Assignment

async function assignDatasourceRole(email: string, datasource: string, role: 'admin' | 'viewer'): Promise<void> {
  await fetch(`${GLEAN_API}/datasources/${datasource}/permissions`, {
    method: 'PUT',
    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${GLEAN_API_TOKEN}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({ user: email, role, allowedGroups: [`${datasource}-${role}s`] }),
  });
}

async function revokeDatasourceAccess(email: string, datasource: string): Promise<void> {
  await fetch(`${GLEAN_API}/datasources/${datasource}/permissions/${email}`, {
    method: 'DELETE',
    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${GLEAN_API_TOKEN}` },
  });
}

Audit Logging

interface GleanAuditEntry {
  timestamp: string; userId: string; action: 'search' | 'view' | 'index' | 'permission_change';
  datasource: string; query?: string; documentId?: string; result: 'allowed' | 'denied';
}

function logSearchAccess(entry: GleanAuditEntry): void {
  console.log(JSON.stringify({ ...entry, org: process.env.GLEAN_ORG_ID }));
}

RBAC Checklist

Each connector maps source-system ACLs to Glean allowedGroups
API tokens scoped per datasource, not organization-wide
SAML/SSO groups synced with Glean user groups daily
Document-level permissions verified after each connector sync
Search analytics reviewed monthly for unauthorized access patterns
Token rotation policy enforced quarterly
Sensitive datasources restricted to named allowedGroups only

Error Handling

Issue	Cause	Fix
User sees documents from wrong team	AllowedGroups not mapped to connector	Reconfigure connector ACL mapping in admin console
`403 Forbidden` on search API	Expired or wrong-scope API token	Regenerate token with correct datasource scope
Stale permissions after IdP change	Connector sync lag	Trigger manual resync from Glean admin
Missing search results	Overly restrictive allowedGroups	Audit group membership against source system ACLs

Prerequisites

A source-of-truth group inventory, named data owner, and two synthetic test identities: one authorized and one explicitly denied.
A least-privilege admin role that can stage a mapping in one non-production datasource without changing organization-wide access.
A rollback record capturing the prior mapping by opaque group ID; never place real group membership exports or search results in tickets.

Instructions

Map source ACL groups to opaque target groups and require a one-to-one owner approval for every expanded access path.
Stage the change on a low-risk datasource, then run the allow and deny test identities against a fictitious document identifier.
Promote only when both tests match the source ACL; otherwise restore the prior mapping and investigate the IdP or connector sync boundary.
Log the actor, change request, datasource, mapping revision, and outcomes without query text, document titles, or user email addresses.
Recheck after the next identity synchronization and revoke the mapping immediately if it grants access beyond the approved scope.

Output

Produce an RBAC change receipt: datasource, prior and new mapping revisions, approving owner, staged/production status, synthetic allow and deny outcomes, sync watermark, and rollback reference. The receipt must contain only opaque IDs and aggregate counts.

Examples

Example: datasource=staging-contracts; mapping_rev=42; owner=legal-ops; allow_probe=pass; deny_probe=pass; sync=2026-08-27T14:00Z; rollback=rev41. This proves the boundary without disclosing membership or content.

Resources

Next Steps

See glean-security-basics.